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Abstract 
Many analysts have argued that energy efficiency investments offer an enormous “win-win” 
opportunity to both reduce negative externalities and save money. This overview paper presents 
a simple model of investment in energy-using capital stock with two types of market failures: 
first, uninternalized externalities from energy consumption, and second, forces such as imperfect 
information that cause consumers and firms not to exploit privately-profitable energy efficiency 
investments. The model clarifies that only if the second type of market failure cannot be 
addressed directly through mechanisms such as information provision, energy efficiency 
subsidies and standards may be merited. We therefore review the empirical work on the 
magnitude of profitable unexploited energy efficiency investments, a literature which frequently 
does not meet modern standards for credibly estimating the net present value of energy cost 
savings and often leaves other benefits and costs unmeasured. These problems notwithstanding, 
recent empirical work in a variety of contexts implies that on average the magnitude of profitable 
unexploited investment opportunities is much smaller than engineering-accounting studies 
suggest.  Finally, there is tremendous opportunity and need for policy-relevant research that 
utilizes randomized controlled trials and quasi-experimental techniques to estimate the returns to 
energy efficiency investments and the welfare effects of energy efficiency programs. 
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Many analysts of the energy industry have long believed that energy efficiency offers an 
enormous “win-win” opportunity: through aggressive energy conservation policies, we can both 
save money and reduce negative externalities associated with energy use. In 1979, Pulitzer Prize-
winning author Daniel Yergin and the Harvard Business School Energy Project made an early 
version of this argument in the book Energy Future: 
 
If the United States were to make a serious commitment to conservation, it might well 
consume 30 to 40 percent less energy than it now does, and still enjoy the same or an 
even higher standard of living . . . Although some of the barriers are economic, they are 
in most cases institutional, political, and social. Overcoming them requires a government 
policy that champions conservation, that gives it a chance equal in the marketplace to that 
enjoyed by conventional sources of energy. 
 
Thirty years later, consultancy McKinsey & Co. made a similar argument in its 2009 
report, Unlocking Energy Efficiency in the U.S. Economy:  
 
Energy efficiency offers a vast, low-cost energy resource for the U.S. economy—but only 
if the nation can craft a comprehensive and innovative approach to unlock it. Significant 
and persistent barriers will need to be addressed at multiple levels to stimulate demand 
for energy efficiency and manage its delivery . . . If executed at scale, a holistic approach 
would yield gross energy savings worth more than $1.2 trillion, well above the $520 
billion needed through 2020 for upfront investment in efficiency measures (not including 
program costs). Such a program is estimated to reduce end-use energy consumption in 
2020 by 9.1 quadrillion BTUs, roughly 23 percent of projected demand, potentially 
abating up to 1.1 gigatons of greenhouse gases annually.  
 
In economic language, the “win-win” argument is that government intervention to 
encourage energy efficiency can improve welfare for two reasons. First, the consumption of 
fossil fuels, which comprise the bulk of our current energy sources, causes externalities such as 
harm to human health, climate change, and constraints on the foreign policy objectives of 
energy-importing countries. Second, other forces such as imperfect information may cause 
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consumers and firms not to undertake privately profitable investments in energy efficiency. 
These forces, which we refer to as “investment inefficiencies,” would create what is popularly 
called an Energy Efficiency Gap: a wedge between the cost-minimizing level of energy 
efficiency and the level actually realized. Yergin, McKinsey & Co., and other analysts have 
argued that this gap represents a significant share of total energy use: in their view, the ground is 
littered with $20 bills that energy consumers have failed to pick up.  
The energy efficiency policy debate often comingles these two types of market failures—
energy use externalities and investment inefficiencies—causing imprecision in research 
questions and policy goals. In this paper, we distinguish between the two market failures and 
clarify their separate policy implications. If energy use externalities are the only market failure, it 
is well known that the social optimum is obtained with Pigouvian taxes or equivalent cap-and-
trade programs that internalize these externalities into energy prices, and that substitute policies 
are often much less economically efficient. If investment inefficiencies also exist, the first-best 
policy is to address the inefficiency directly: for example, by providing information to 
imperfectly informed consumers. However, when these interventions are not fully effective and 
investment inefficiencies remain, policies that subsidize or mandate energy efficiency might 
increase welfare. The central economic question around energy efficiency is thus whether there 
are investment inefficiencies that a policy could correct—in other words, “Is there an Energy 
Efficiency Gap?” 
We examine two classes of evidence on the existence and magnitude of investment 
inefficiencies that could cause the Energy Efficiency Gap. First, we examine choices made by 
consumers and firms, testing whether they fail to make investments that would increase utility or 
profits. Second, we focus on specific investment inefficiencies, testing for evidence consistent 
with each. After presenting the evidence, we discuss policy implications. Throughout the paper, 
we highlight how the economics of energy efficiency connects to important questions in other 
applied micro fields, including behavioral economics, industrial organization, and development 
microeconomics.   
Three key conclusions arise. First, although there is a long literature assessing investment 
inefficiencies related to energy efficiency, this body of evidence frequently does not meet 
modern standards for credibility. A basic problem is that much of the evidence on the energy 
cost savings from energy efficiency comes from engineering analyses or observational studies 
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that can suffer from a set of well-known biases. Furthermore, even if the energy cost savings 
were known, energy efficiency investments often have other unobserved costs and benefits, 
making it difficult to assess welfare effects. This problem is general to other economic 
applications: in order to argue that an agent is not maximizing an objective function, the analyst 
must credibly observe that objective function in full. We believe that there is great potential for a 
new body of credible empirical work in this area, both because the questions are so important 
and because there are significant unexploited opportunities for randomized controlled trials and 
quasi-experimental designs that have advanced knowledge in other domains.  
Second, when one tallies up the available empirical evidence from different contexts, it is 
difficult to substantiate claims of a pervasive Energy Efficiency Gap. Some consumers appear to 
be imperfectly informed, and the evidence suggests that investment inefficiencies do cause an 
increase in energy use in various settings. However, the empirical magnitudes of the investment 
inefficiencies appear to be smaller, indeed substantially smaller, than the massive potential 
savings calculated in engineering analyses such as McKinsey & Co. (2009).   
Third, because consumers are quite heterogeneous in the degree of their investment 
inefficiencies, it is crucial to design targeted policies. Subsidizing energy efficient durables, for 
example, changes relative prices for all consumers. While this policy will increase welfare for 
some consumers, such benefits must be traded off against distortions to consumers not subject to 
inefficiencies. Policy evaluations must therefore consider not just how much a policy increases 
energy efficiency, but what types of consumers are induced to become more energy efficient. 
Welfare gains will be larger from a policy that preferentially affects the decisions of consumers 
subject to investment inefficiencies. 
 
Background Facts on Energy Demand 
 
Overview of Energy Demand and Energy Efficiency 
Table 1 presents the breakdown of total energy demand across the sectors of the U.S. 
economy. Much of our discussion focuses on household energy use and personal transportation 
instead of commercial and industrial energy use, because these are areas where inefficiencies of 
imperfect information might be more severe. In 2007, the average U.S. household spent $2,400 
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on gasoline for their autos and another $1,900 on natural gas, electricity, and heating oil (U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2007). Of this latter figure, heating and cooling are the most 
significant end uses, which suggests that they may also be the areas where energy conservation 
could have the largest effect. 
The smaller the variance in energy costs across products relative to the total purchase 
price, the more likely it is that consumers will choose to remain imperfectly informed about, or 
inattentive to, these costs (Sallee, 2011). Figure 1 shows the lifetime energy cost of a selection of 
energy-using durables, discounted at 6 percent over each good’s typical lifetime, as well as the 
ratio of energy cost to the purchase price. For example, if gasoline costs $3 per gallon, lifetime 
gasoline costs are $19,000 for a typical pickup truck, or 83 percent of the purchase price, and 
$10,000 for a relatively energy efficient sedan, or about 66 percent of purchase price. Typical 
lifetime energy costs are five times greater than purchase prices for air conditioners and 12 times 
greater for incandescent light bulbs, but only about one-third of purchase price for a typical 
refrigerator. 
The most aggregate measure of energy efficiency is the ratio of GDP to total energy use, 
with different energy sources combined using common physical units.  As shown in Figure 2, 
U.S. “energy productivity” per unit of GDP is 2.4 times higher than in 1949. Various factors 
drive this continual improvement, including compositional changes in the economy toward less-         
energy-intensive industries, energy efficiency policies, and other forces that drive total factor 
productivity growth. Energy prices also induce factor substitution and technical change: the 
figure suggests this effect, showing that the fastest improvements in energy productivity were in 
the 1970s and the most recent 15 years, both periods of relatively high energy prices. The figure 
also shows that U.S. energy productivity has grown faster than total factor productivity since the 
beginning of that data series in 1987, meaning that through some combination of directed 
technical change and factor substitution, the United States is economizing on energy faster than 
it is economizing on other factors. The U.S. economy is more energy intensive than other OECD 
countries, although it has improved more quickly since 1980, and less energy intensive than the 
set of low- and middle-income countries. In sum, the U.S. economy is progressively becoming 
less energy intensive, although this is uninformative about whether the United States is at or near 
the economically efficient level of energy efficiency.  
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Energy Efficiency Policy in the United States 
The United States has enacted a wide array of policies to encourage energy efficiency, 
many of which were originally promulgated during the energy crises of the 1970s. Table 2 
presents the most significant of these policies, along with some measure of their annual costs. 
Auto industry policies include: Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, which 
require that the new cars and trucks sold by each auto manufacturer meet a minimum average 
rating based on miles-per-gallon; tax credits of up to $3,400 for hybrid vehicle buyers; and “gas 
guzzler taxes” ranging from $1,000 to $7,700 on the sale of passenger cars with low fuel 
economy. There are a series of national-level minimum energy efficiency standards for 
household appliances, such as refrigerators, air conditioners, and washing machines. 
Additionally, many states have building codes that encourage energy efficiency by, for example, 
stipulating minimum amounts of required insulation. Furthermore, electricity bill surcharges 
fund billions of dollars of utility-managed “demand-side management” programs, which include 
subsidized residential and commercial energy audits, energy efficiency information provision, 
and subsidies for energy efficient appliances and other capital investments.  
“Weatherization” is frequently used as a general term for a set of residential energy 
efficiency investments primarily including wall and attic insulation, improved heating, 
ventilation and air conditioning systems, and “air-sealing,” which reduces the leakage of hot or 
cold outside air. Through the Weatherization Assistance Program, the federal government 
transfers $250 million annually to state agencies to weatherize approximately 100,000 low-
income homes. Weatherization funding grew significantly due to the 2009 American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act. In total, that legislation and related economic stimulus bills included $17 
billion in energy efficiency spending, including non-low-income weatherization programs, 
automobile and appliance cash-for-clunkers programs with energy efficiency requirements on 
new models, and other grants to state programs.  
In this paper, the phrase “energy efficiency policies” refers to this set of subsidies and 
standards that directly encourage investment in energy efficient capital stock but do not directly 
affect energy prices. Although gasoline taxes, cap-and-trade programs, or other policies that 
affect energy prices will of course also increase investment in energy efficient capital stock, 
these policies that act through energy prices are conceptually distinct in our policy analysis. 
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A Model of Investment in Energy Efficiency 
The basic economics of energy efficiency are captured by a model in which an agent, 
either a profit-maximizing firm or utility-maximizing consumer, chooses between two different 
versions of an energy-using durable good such as an automobile, air conditioner, or light bulb.1 
This setup can also represent a choice of whether to improve the energy efficiency of an existing 
building, for example through weatherization. In the first period, the agent chooses and pays for 
capital investments. In the second period, the consumer uses the good and incurs energy costs.  
The two different goods are denoted 0, for the energy inefficient baseline, and 1, for the 
energy efficient version. They have energy intensities e0 and e1, respectively, with e0 > e1. The 
energy efficient good has incremental upfront capital cost c > 0 and unobserved incremental 
opportunity cost or utility cost ξ. The variable ξ could either be positive (an unobserved cost) or 
negative (an unobserved benefit). The private cost of energy is p, and the risk-adjusted discount 
rate between the two periods is r > 0. The variable m depends represents an agent’s taste for 
usage of the durable good; a high m reflects an air conditioner user in a hot climate or a car 
owner who drives a long way to work. The variable m is implicitly a function of energy prices: 
as energy prices rise, the cost of utilization increases, so utilization decreases. We index mi to 
explicitly recognize that it varies across agents, although in practice ξ and p will also vary. 
In the basic case, an agent’s willingness-to-pay for the energy efficient good is the 
discounted energy cost savings net of unobserved costs. Agent i will choose the energy efficient 
good if and only if willingness to pay outweighs the incremental capital costs: 
 
pmi(e0 – e1) / (1 + r) – ξ > c.                         (1) 
                                                            
1 The model presented here is an adaptation of the model in Allcott, Mullainathan, and 
Taubinsky (2011). It resembles a generalized Roy model. It abstracts away from factors which 
may be relevant in some settings, including the irreversibility of some energy efficiency 
investments and uncertainty over energy costs (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Hassett and Metcalf, 
1993) and explicit models of imperfect information in the purchase or resale of the good.  
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To capture the essence of the Energy Efficiency Gap, we introduce the parameter γ, which is an 
implicit weight on the energy cost savings in the agent’s decision. Now, the agent chooses the 
energy efficient good if and only if: 
 
γpmi(e0 – e1) / (1 + r) – ξ  > c.               (2) 
 
For the purpose of determining the effects of subsidizing the energy efficient good, the γ 
parameter is a sufficient statistic for all investment inefficiencies. As we will discuss later in 
more detail, there are several distinct types of investment inefficiencies. First, agents may be 
unaware of, imperfectly informed about, or inattentive to energy cost savings. Second, agents 
may be themselves perfectly informed but unable to convey costlessly the energy intensity e1 of 
an improved house or apartment they are selling or renting to others. Third, credit markets may 
be imperfect, meaning that agents may not have access to credit at the risk-adjusted discount rate 
r. 2 The γ parameter is conceptually related to what others have called an “implied discount 
rate,” which is the discount rate that rationalizes the tradeoffs that agents make between upfront 
investment costs and future energy savings.  
It is often asserted that γ < 1, meaning that investment inefficiencies cause agents to value 
discounted energy cost savings less than upfront costs. Notice that when this is the case, some 
agents do not choose the energy efficient good despite the fact that this would be profitable at 
current energy prices. Formally, asserting that there is an “Energy Efficiency Gap” is exactly 
equivalent to asserting that there are investment inefficiencies and γ < 1. Of course, in some 
settings it might be that γ > 1.  
Other than the investment inefficiencies captured by γ, the additional element of the 
“win-win argument” is that there are additional social costs from energy use that are not 
internalized into energy prices. We denote this uninternalized externality by φ. In the social 
optimum, the agent adopts the energy efficient good if: 
 
(p + φ)mi(e0 – e1) / (1 + r) – ξ > c.               (3) 
                                                            
2 Credit constraints are a frequently discussed investment inefficiency. Although we note the 
issue in theory, there is not much empirical evidence in the context of energy efficiency, so we 
will not discuss it further. 
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 The social optimum differs from the agent’s choice in the previous equation for two reasons. 
First, the allocation accounts for the externality φ. Second, the allocation is not affected by 
investment inefficiencies, so γ = 1.  
Figure 3 illustrates the three cases. The figure’s horizontal axis represents the quantity of 
the energy efficient good that is purchased, while the vertical axis shows the incremental costs 
and benefits of purchasing that good.  The height of a demand curve at each point reflects some 
individual agent’s willingness-to-pay from the left-hand side of a corresponding equation above. 
The agents on the left side of the figure, with higher willingness-to-pay, tend to have high usage 
m, low unobserved cost ξ, and high energy price p.   
The lowest demand curve, denoted D, reflects the case in the second equation with both 
investment inefficiencies (γ < 1) and uninternalized energy use externalities. In this case, the 
market equilibrium is at point a, the intersection of demand curve D with incremental cost c. 
Demand curve D’ reflects the case in the first equation with no investment inefficiencies, but 
energy still priced below social cost. Demand curve D’’ reflects the social optimum in the third 
equation, where there are no investment inefficiencies and energy prices include externality φ. 
Adding a Pigouvian tax on energy consumption (based on the energy source’s pollution content) 
increases willingness-to-pay more for the consumers on the left of the figure with higher 
utilization, so demand curve D’’ rotates clockwise relative to demand curve D’. The first-best 
equilibrium is point d, where D’’ intersects incremental cost c. 
From a policy perspective, it is crucial to distinguish the two types of market failures, 
energy use externalities and investment inefficiencies. The reason derives from the general 
principle that policies should address market failures as directly as possible. If there are no 
investment inefficiencies but energy prices are below social cost due to uninternalized energy 
use externalities, demand is represented by D’. This causes a distortion both in the purchase and 
in the utilization of energy-using durables: for example, consumers buy too many gas guzzlers 
and drive them too much. A Pigouvian tax of amount φ on energy (on gas, in the example) 
would give both the socially optimal quantity demanded (q’’) of the energy efficient good and 
the socially optimal utilization. By contrast, as long as utilization is not fully price-inelastic, a 
subsidy for the energy efficient good does not achieve the first best. While this could move 
quantity demanded to q’’, consumers would not face the true social cost of energy when deciding 
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how much to use the good: consumers would buy the right number of gas guzzlers but still drive 
them too much. 
Many investment inefficiencies, on the other hand, distort purchases but not utilization. If 
there are investment inefficiencies but no uninternalized energy use externalities, the optimal 
corrective policy affects purchases, but not utilization. For example, Allcott, Mullainathan, and 
Taubinsky (2012) show that when consumers have homogeneous γ < 1 and vary only in 
utilization mi, the first-best policy involves a subsidy for the energy efficient good.3 In Figure 3, 
that optimal subsidy would move quantity demanded from q to q’. Notice that an energy tax 
could potentially also correct the investment inefficiency, giving the same marginal consumer at 
q’. However, as long as utilization is not fully inelastic, an energy tax that gives price above 
social cost (to correct the investment inefficiency), would cause consumers to reduce utilization 
below the first-best level: consumers would buy the right number of gas guzzlers and then drive 
them too little. 
Putting these arguments together, when there are distortions from both uninternalized 
energy use externalities and investment inefficiencies, the first-best policy involves both 
Pigouvian taxes on energy and a second mechanism to increase quantity demanded of the energy 
efficient good.  This second mechanism may be a subsidy for the energy efficient good, although 
as we will discuss later in the paper, heterogeneity in the investment inefficiency γ makes 
subsidies potentially less desirable.  
How can this framework be used for cost–benefit analysis? Consider first adding the 
subsidy in isolation, without any Pigouvian tax on energy. When there are investment 
inefficiencies, the original marginal consumer at quantity q gains amount af from being induced 
to buy the energy efficient good. In fact, there are allocative gains from inducing each of the 
consumers between q and q’ to purchase the energy efficient good, as each of these consumers 
has benefits that are larger than incremental cost c. The total private welfare gains are illustrated 
by the triangle abf. If a Pigouvian tax on energy is added to this subsidy, then the total social 
welfare gain is illustrated by the triangle adg. 
These benefits are then compared against the costs of the policy. A subsidy involves a 
transfer of public funds to consumers of amount hbjk, as illustrated by the shaded rectangle. If 
                                                            
3 Heutel (2011) obtains a comparable result using a different model of investment inefficiencies. 
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those funds could otherwise be used to lower labor taxes, the deadweight loss of these taxes 
would be included as a social cost, along with any other costs of administering the subsidy.4 
Similarly, an information program that moved demand from D to D’ would also increase private 
welfare by abf, and this welfare gain would be traded off with the costs of implementation. For 
any policy, it will be an empirical question whether the costs exceed the benefits, and whether 
the net benefits are larger than alternative policies. This approach to assessing net welfare 
benefits is the appropriate test of whether energy efficiency policies are socially beneficial when 
Pigouvian taxes are also available to correct energy use externalities. 
To summarize, this section has analyzed two forces that can cause behavior to differ from 
the social optimum: energy use externalities and investment inefficiencies.  If there are energy 
use externalities but no investment inefficiencies, ideally only Pigouvian taxes would be used. If 
there are investment inefficiencies, energy efficiency policies such as subsidies for energy 
efficient capital stock might have benefits that outweigh their costs. If there are both investment 
inefficiencies and energy use externalities, then Pigouvian taxes should be used in combination 
with some welfare-improving energy efficiency policy. The central economic questions are thus 
whether there are investment inefficiencies, and if so, whether the benefits of a corrective policy 
outweigh its costs.  
In the next section, we will examine choices by consumers and firms to adopt or not 
adopt energy efficient technologies and attempt to infer whether there is an Energy Efficiency 
Gap. When there are no investment inefficiencies, agents’ choices are governed by the first 
equation above, and unobserved factors such as costs ξ or utilization m can be inferred from their 
decisions. Some analysts have relied heavily on this framework in explaining away an apparent 
Energy Efficiency Gap, with an argument along the lines that “agents are well-informed, so if 
they are not energy efficient, then it must be that the unobserved costs of energy efficiency are 
large.” The analysis is more difficult when there might be investment inefficiencies. In that case, 
we now must know everything about agents’ objective functions to estimate the size of γ. 
Three types of problems will pervade the analyses we review in the next section. First, 
factors that are difficult to observe or quantify, as denoted by ξ in our model above, will be 
potentially very relevant. Second, estimates of the net present value of energy cost savings are 
                                                            
4 Analogously, a Pigouvian tax brings in public funds that can be used to lower labor taxes, 
which should be counted as an additional benefit (Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996). 
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often questionable. Depending on the setting, this could be because the analyst does not know 
the change in energy intensity (e0  – e1), the utilization m, or the appropriate discount rate r. 
Third, there is often substantial heterogeneity across consumers in utilization and unobserved 
costs, meaning that average returns for adopters might be uninformative about average returns 
for non-adopters or returns for the marginal adopter. 
These empirical problems directly parallel other economic contexts. Consider, for 
example, the question of whether farmers in developing countries could profitably adopt 
agricultural technologies such as fertilizer and high-yielding variety seeds. These technologies 
have unobserved costs, such as increased labor inputs (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2010). It is 
difficult to know the resulting increase in profits without randomized controlled trials, as in 
Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson (2011). Also, the substantial heterogeneity in costs and gross 
returns means that the fact that adopters have high returns does not imply that non-adopters are 
foregoing a profitable investment (Suri, 2011). 
 
Evidence on Returns to Energy Efficiency Investments 
In this section, we analyze the evidence on whether consumers and firms leave profitable 
energy efficiency investments on the table. There are four categories of evidence: engineering 
estimates of returns to potential investments, empirical estimates of returns to observed 
investments, the cost effectiveness of energy conservation programs run by electric utilities, and 
estimated demand patterns for energy-using durables.  
 
Engineering Estimates of Energy Conservation Cost Curves 
While the McKinsey & Co. (2009) study quoted in our introduction has garnered 
substantial attention, it is preceded by a long literature that uses engineering cost estimates to 
construct “supply curves” for energy efficiency (for example, Meier, Wright, and Rosenfeld  
1983; ACEEE 1989; Goldstein, Mowris, Davis, and Dolan 1990; Koomey et al. 1991; Brown, 
Levine, Romm, Rosenfeld, and Koomey 1998; National Academy of Sciences 1992; Rosenfeld, 
Atkinson, Koomey, Meier, Mowris, and Price 1993; Stoft 1995; Blumstein and Stoft 1995; 
Brown, Levine, Short, and Koomey 2001). The basic approach in such studies is to calculate the 
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net present value of a set of possible energy efficiency investments given assumed capital costs, 
energy prices, investment horizons, and discount rates.  
Across many studies from different industries and sectors, a common theme seems to 
emerge: large fractions of energy can be conserved at negative net cost. That is, the studies 
conclude that consumers and firms are failing to exploit a massive amount of profitable 
investment opportunities in energy efficiency. For example, a meta-analysis by Rosenfeld, 
Atkinson, Koomey, Meier, Mowris, and Price (1993) concludes that between 20 and 60 percent 
of total electricity use, depending on the study and the electricity cost assumption, can be 
conserved at negative cost. The McKinsey & Co. (2009) analysis quoted in our introduction 
suggests that 23 percent of U.S. non-transportation energy demand can be eliminated at negative 
cost. These engineering studies are a large part of the basis for the claims about the Energy 
Efficiency Gap. 
However, it is difficult to take at face value the quantitative conclusions of the 
engineering analyses as they suffer from the empirical problems introduced in the previous 
section. First, engineering costs typically incorporate only upfront capital costs and omit 
opportunity costs or other unobserved factors (ξ  in the model presented earlier). For example, 
Anderson and Newell (2004) analyze energy audits that the U.S. Department of Energy provides 
for free to small- and medium-sized enterprises. They find that nearly half of investments that 
engineering assessments showed would have short payback periods were not adopted due to 
unaccounted physical costs, risks, or opportunity costs, such as “lack of staff for 
analysis/implementation,” “risk of inconvenience to personnel,” or “suspected risk of problem 
with equipment.” 
Second, the engineering estimates of energy saved may be faulty. For example, in the 
context of home energy weatherization, Dubin, Miedema, and Chandran (1986), Nadel and 
Keating (1991), and others have documented that engineering estimates of energy savings can 
overstate true field returns, sometimes by a large amount. Even in the two decades since these 
studies, some engineering simulation models have still not been fully calibrated to approximate 
actual returns (Blasnik, 2010). 
 
Empirical Estimates of Returns on Investment 
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Another approach to measuring the Energy Efficiency Gap is to use empirical energy use 
data to estimate the average returns for the set of consumers that adopt an energy efficient 
technology. Most of the evidence in this category analyzes the costs and benefits of the 
Weatherization Assistance Program, which is intended to be both a transfer to low-income 
homeowners and an energy efficiency investment with positive net returns. The typical empirical 
analysis compares natural gas billing data in the first year after the weatherization work was 
done to the year before, using either a statistical correction for weather differences or a non-
randomly selected control group of low-income households. Schweitzer (2005) analyzes 38 
separate empirical evaluations of weatherization projects from 19 states from between 1993 and 
2005, reweighting them to reflect the observable characteristics of the national Weatherization 
Assistance Program. The average weatherization job costs $2,600 and reduces natural gas use by 
20 to 25 percent, or about $260 per year.  
As evidence on the Energy Efficiency Gap, such analyses again suffer from the problems 
introduced in the previous section. First, there are potentially substantial unobserved costs and 
benefits (the ξ in our model) from weatherization. Weatherization takes time, and for most 
people it is not highly enjoyable: the process requires one or sometimes two home energy audits, 
a contractor appointment to carry out the work, and sometimes additional follow-up visits and 
paperwork. Some benefits are also difficult to quantify: for example, weatherization typically 
makes homes more comfortable and less drafty. Furthermore, weatherization reduces the cost of 
energy services such as warmer indoor temperatures on a cold winter day, and this cost reduction 
causes people to increase their utilization of these services. (In the energy literature, this is called 
the “rebound effect.”) Measuring the change in energy use from weatherization without 
accounting for the utility gain from an increase in utilization of energy services understates the 
welfare benefits. 
Second, the net present value of energy cost reductions is unknown. The empirical 
estimates are based on short-term analyses, and the persistence of returns over many years is 
rarely assessed.5 If the $260 annual savings from Schweitzer (2005) are assumed to have a 
                                                            
5 Sumi and Coates (1989) find 14 percent cumulative degradation of energy savings for 
Weatherization Assistance Program participants in Seattle after the first six years. Additional 
evidence using more recent data would be valuable, as would information on whether the rate of 
depreciation changes over time. 
14 
 
lifetime of 10 years or less, then weatherization does not pay back the $2,600 cost at any positive 
discount rate.  At lifetimes of 15 or 20 years, the discount rate that equates future discounted 
benefits with current costs (the internal rate of return) is 5.6 or 7.8 percent, respectively. 
Furthermore, all of the estimates are non-experimental, and households that weatherize may also 
engage in other unobserved activities that affect energy use. This may be a larger concern with 
non-low-income weatherization programs, in which homeowners might be more likely to carry 
out renovations and energy efficiency work at the same time. 
Third, the effects of weatherization on energy use are heterogeneous. For example, 
Metcalf and Hassett (1999) estimate the distribution of returns to attic insulation in the U.S. 
population using a weather-adjusted difference estimator with nationally representative panel 
data. The estimated median and mean returns on investment are on the order of 10 percent, and 
one-quarter of households had returns greater than 13.5 percent. This heterogeneity means that 
while estimates of average returns for adopters could in principle be meaningful in evaluating the 
costs and benefits of an existing program, a simple selection model like the one above would 
imply that the net returns for adopters overstate the net returns for non-adopters. On net, the 
available evidence seems inconsistent with significant investment inefficiencies in the context of 
weatherization. 
 
Cost Effectiveness of Energy Conservation Programs 
Many electric utilities run “demand-side management” programs, which largely consist 
of subsidies to households and firms to purchase energy efficient appliances, air conditioning and 
heating systems, and other equipment. If these programs can reduce energy use at less than the 
cost of energy, the argument goes, then there were investment inefficiencies, and the programs 
should be viewed as welfare-enhancing. 
The simplest example of this approach is to divide the annual spending on these programs 
by utilities’ estimates of electricity savings, as in Gillingham, Newell, and Palmer (2006). These 
estimated savings are typically from engineering estimates of electricity savings or non-
experimental comparisons of energy use between program participants and non-participants. For 
2009, U.S. electric utilities reported $2.255 billion in direct costs and 76.9 terawatt-hours of 
savings for demand-side management programs, according to the 2009 Electric Power Annual 
(EIA 2010, tables 9.6 and 9.7). Dividing these two figures gives a cost effectiveness of 2.9 cents 
15 
 
per kilowatt-hour (kWh). Friedrich, Eldridge, York, Witte, and Kushler (2009) also use utilities’ 
estimates of electricity savings to calculate a cost effectiveness of 2.5 cents per kilowatt-hour.  
Analyses such as these suffer from the same problems introduced in the previous section. 
First, the reported “costs” are typically costs to the utility, not including costs incurred by 
program participants, which may be almost as large (Nadel and Geller, 1996; Joskow and 
Marron, 1992; Eto, Kito, Shown, and Sonnenblick 1995; Friedrich, Eldridge, York, Witte, and 
Kushler 2009). Second, energy savings are estimated using engineering analyses or observational 
data, and it is difficult to establish a credible counterfactual level of energy use in the absence of 
the program. The most rigorous solution is to use randomized controlled experiments to evaluate 
demand-side management programs. The feasibility of this approach is demonstrated by recent 
experimental evaluations of programs that send letters that compare a household’s energy use to 
that of their neighbors and provide energy conservation tips (Allcott 2011b; Ayres, Raseman, 
and Shih 2009). 
The most advanced estimate in this literature is by Arimura, Li, Newell, and Palmer 
(2011), whose point estimates indicate that between 1992 and 2006, demand-side management 
conserved electricity at a program cost of 5.0 and 6.1 cents per kilowatt-hour, assuming discount 
rates of 5 and 7 percent, respectively.6 If one further assumes, based on the analyses in the 
paragraph above, that additional costs to consumers might be 70 percent of program costs, one 
concludes that demand-side management programs have reduced energy use at an average cost 
of 5.0 x (1 + .70) = 8.5 cents/kWh or 6.1 x (1 + .70) = 10.4 cents/kWh, again using 5 or 7 percent 
discount rates, respectively. Comparing the investment cost per kWh conserved to the national 
average electricity price of 9.1 cents/kWh, the investments that occurred because of demand-side 
management programs were barely profitable at a discount rate of 5 percent, and barely 
unprofitable at a discount rate of 7 percent.7 Arimura et al. (2011) estimate that these programs 
reduced 1–2 percent of national electricity demand. Given that only a small percent of total 
                                                            
6 Arimura, Li, Newell, and Palmer (2011) also calculate cost effectiveness of 3.0 and 4.1 cents 
per kilowatt-hour using discount rates of zero percent and three percent, respectively. The 
authors focus on their results for a five percent discount rate. 
7 The text offers a back-of-the-envelope version of the more sophisticated calculation that should 
be done. One implicit assumption is that there are no consumers that are inframarginal to the 
demand-side management subsidies. If there are inframarginal consumers, then some of the 
program costs were in fact transfers, and the incremental investment costs induced by the 
demand-side management programs were smaller.  
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electricity demand was reduced at nearly zero excess profits, this evidence on demand-side 
management energy conservation programs does not suggest a pervasive Energy Efficiency Gap. 
 
Tradeoffs between Durable Goods 
The final way of determining whether there are profitable returns to energy efficiency 
investments involves estimating consumer demand for household appliances or automobiles. 
This approach typically uses a discrete choice model to estimate utility function coefficients on 
purchase price and on the present discounted value of energy costs. The estimated coefficient on 
energy cost should be the same as the estimated coefficient on price: that is, consumers should be 
indifferent between spending a dollar in present value on energy and a dollar in present value on 
purchase price. If the analyst’s assumptions about discount rates, product utilization, and energy 
prices are correct, the ratio of these two coefficients is the γ in our model above. 
In a seminal paper, Hausman (1979) estimated a discrete choice model using 65 
observations of consumer choices between air conditioner models, which vary in upfront cost 
and energy efficiency rating. Hausman framed his analysis as an estimate of an “implied 
discount rate” that rationalizes the demand system by assuming γ = 1. Hausman’s paper, along 
with Dubin and McFadden’s (1984) analysis of households’ choices between heating systems, 
was the state of the art in this literature for 30 years. Both papers find real implied discount rates 
of 15 to 25 percent, which is higher than returns on stock market investments but not much 
different from real credit card interest rates, which were around 18 percent. 
However, such analyses suffer from the problems introduced in the previous section. 
First, unobserved product attributes (which are analogous to ξ in our formal model) complicate 
the cross-sectional econometric approach. The coefficient on the present discounted value of 
energy costs is biased if energy efficient products have better or worse unobserved 
characteristics. For example, automobile prices actually decrease in fuel economy, as the more 
energy efficient vehicles are smaller and often have fewer luxury amenities. Furthermore, 
product prices will often be correlated with unobserved attributes, giving the usual simultaneity 
bias in estimating price elasticity. As in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), this issue can 
potentially be addressed by using instrumental variables, but the instruments available may be 
dissatisfying. 
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Working papers by Allcott and Wozny (2011), Busse, Knittel, and Zettelmeyer (2012), 
and Sallee, West, and Fan (2011) use an alternative approach to address the problem of 
unobserved attributes. These papers take a panel of used durable goods, condition on product 
fixed effects, and test how the relative prices of more energy efficient vs. less efficient products 
change as energy price expectations vary over time. As an intuitive example of the identification 
strategy, notice that as expected gasoline prices rise, we should expect to see the market price of 
a three-year-old used Honda Civic increase relative to the price of a three-year-old Honda 
Accord, because the Civic is more energy efficient than the Accord. If market prices are not very 
responsive, this approach suggests that γ is small.  
Relative to the other categories of evidence on the Energy Efficiency Gap, this approach 
is especially appealing because the fixed effects eliminate unobserved costs by construction. 
However, these analyses still suffer from the second problem, which is that they still require 
assumptions about the relevant discount rate, vehicle-miles traveled, and consumers’ 
expectations of future gasoline prices (r, m, and p in our model above), and other factors. Allcott 
and Wozny’s (2011) results tend to suggest that γ < 1, while Busse, Knittel, and Zettelmeyer’s 
(2012) results tend not to support the hypothesis that γ < 1.  The two analyses do agree that even 
if there is some investment inefficiency, the welfare losses would be relatively small. Allcott and 
Wozny show how to use discrete choice data to calculate the private welfare loss (equivalent to 
triangle abf in Figure 3 above). Their preferred estimate of γ suggests that investment 
inefficiencies in the auto market cause a welfare loss of about $1 billion per year and an increase 
in gasoline consumption of about 5 percent. Busse, Knittel, and Zettelmeyer’s results tend not to 
suggest that there are investment inefficiencies, implying that there would be zero welfare losses. 
In either case, the welfare loss and gasoline consumption increase appear to be small relative to 
the total market size. 
 
Investment Inefficiencies That Could Cause an Energy Efficiency Gap 
In the previous section, we examined evidence on whether consumers and firms fail to 
exploit profitable energy efficiency investments. In this section, we reverse the perspective by 
specifying particular investment inefficiencies that might cause underinvestment in energy 
efficiency and assessing the empirical evidence on their magnitudes.  
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 Imperfect Information 
Imperfect information is perhaps the most important form of investment inefficiency that 
could cause an Energy Efficiency Gap. Two basic models of imperfect information are most 
relevant. In one model, consumers and firms may be unaware of potential investments in energy 
efficiency. For example, homeowners may not know how poorly insulated their home is and may 
not be aware of the opportunity to weatherize. Similarly, factory managers may not know about a 
new type of machine that could reduce their energy costs.  
An alternative model resembles Akerlof’s (1970) “lemons” model. Buyers know that 
different products, such as apartments, commercial buildings, or factory equipment, have 
different levels of energy efficiency, but these differences are costly to observe. Thus, they are 
not willing to pay more for goods that are in fact more energy efficient. For example, a renter 
evaluating a set of different apartments may be aware that there is a distribution of wall 
insulation quality and thus of resulting heating costs, but the renter will not be willing to pay 
more for a well-insulated apartment without taking the time to inspect the insulation.  
There are three approaches to assessing the magnitude of imperfect information in the 
context of energy efficiency. The first approach is to test for market equilibria consistent with 
imperfect information. Several recent projects used this approach in the context of renter-
occupied vs. owner-occupied housing units. The theory is that because imperfectly informed 
renters will not be willing to pay more for energy efficient apartments, landlords have reduced 
incentive to invest in energy efficiency. Homeowners, on the other hand, do capture the benefits 
of improved energy efficiency, at least until they sell the property. Such a “landlord–tenant” 
agency problem implies that rental properties are less energy efficient than would be socially 
optimal.  
As an example of this approach, Davis (2010) studies the market penetration of 
refrigerators, dishwashers, light bulbs, room air conditioners, and clothes washers that have 
earned the U.S. government’s “Energy Star” designation, meaning that they are relatively energy 
efficient. Conditional on observable characteristics, renters are 1 to 10 percentage points less 
likely to report having Energy Star appliances. In percentage terms, these differences are large: 
they represent between 5.6 and 68 percent of the overall average Energy Star saturation rate. But 
because non-renters are themselves not very likely to own Energy Star appliances and because 
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appliances make up only one-quarter of residential energy use, the differences in appliance 
ownership do not add up to a large difference in energy use: the author calculates that if renters 
had the same energy efficient appliance ownership rates as owner-occupied homes, total energy 
bills in rental homes would be 0.5 percent lower. 
Heating and cooling represent close to one-half of residential energy use, meaning that 
insulation is a more important investment that could be subject to the landlord–tenant agency 
problem. Gillingham, Harding, and Rapson (2012) analyze data from California and show that 
when the resident pays for heating and cooling, owner-occupied dwellings are 13 to 20 percent 
more likely to have insulation than rentals, conditional on other observable characteristics of the 
property, occupant, and neighborhood. As in the Davis (2010) analysis, large percent differences 
do not translate into large increases in energy use: under the optimistic assumption that insulation 
reduces total energy demand by 10 percent, we can see that rental properties would use 1.3 to 2.0 
percent less energy if insulated at the same level as owner-occupied properties. 
Additional research in this area would be important to address problems of both internal 
and external validity. As both Davis (2010) and Gillingham, Harding, and Rapson (2012) note, 
conditional differences in appliance ownership between owners and renters are not ironclad 
causal evidence of a market failure, because preferences could vary in unobservable ways. 
Furthermore, even if estimates from California are internally valid, differences in policies and 
housing stock make it difficult to generalize nationwide. For example, California was a relatively 
early adopter of building codes, which means that more buildings in the state may now be 
insulated, and thus the difference between rental and owner-occupied properties may be smaller 
than in other states. 
If these estimates are assumed to be causal and generalizable, how big is the investment 
inefficiency from the landlord–tenant agency problem? The magnitude is the number of affected 
households times the extent of the reduced energy efficiency. Of U.S. households, 29 percent are 
rental units where the renter pays energy bills (Murtishaw and Sathaye, 2006). Multiplying this 
figure by several percent of total energy demand, to approximate the magnitude of the 
inefficiencies estimated above, implies that the landlord–tenant information problem might 
increase total residential energy use on the order of 1 percent. Thus, while the empirical evidence 
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points to some inefficiency, it explains only a very small fraction of the purported Energy 
Efficiency Gap.8  
An additional example of testing for imperfect information using equilibrium outcomes is 
to examine whether information disclosure increases the elasticity of energy-saving technical 
change with respect to energy prices. The idea is that consumers who are better informed about 
energy use will be more responsive to energy price changes when choosing between models of 
an energy-using durable. Therefore, firms with better-informed consumers will be more likely to 
offer more energy efficient models as energy prices rise. Newell, Jaffe, and Stavins (1999) show 
that the mean energy efficiency of room air conditioners and water heaters was more responsive 
to energy prices after 1981 and 1977, respectively, the years when the federal government 
introduced energy efficiency labeling requirements for the two goods. While other factors might 
also have changed in these years, this finding suggests that the labeling requirements may have 
reduced the extent of imperfect information. However, this approach is not informative about the 
magnitude of any remaining investment inefficiency. 
A second approach that can allow a direct assessment of the magnitude of imperfect 
information is to observe information sets through surveys. Turrentine and Kurani (2007) and 
Larrick and Soll (2008) use structured interviews and laboratory studies to show that consumers 
are not very good at calculating the gasoline costs for different automobiles. The 2010 Vehicle 
Ownership and Alternatives Survey (Allcott, 2011a, 2012) adds nationally representative 
evidence on how accurately consumers perceive the financial value of energy efficiency. The 
data suggest that consumers are indeed imperfectly informed: over half of Americans 
misestimate the gasoline cost differences between the vehicle they own and their “second choice 
vehicle” by more than 40 percent. However, the errors run in both directions. On average, 
consumers appear to either correctly estimate or slightly underestimate the energy cost savings 
from higher-fuel economy vehicles.  
A third approach to assessing the magnitude of imperfect information is to test for the 
effects of information disclosure on purchase decisions. This approach has the benefit of being 
                                                            
8 A related agency problem is that some landlords pay the utilities, while tenants set the 
utilization levels for appliances and heating and cooling equipment. This problem is a small, as 
only 4 percent of U.S. households are rentals with utilities included and demand for energy 
services is relatively inelastic. Levinson and Niemann (2004) estimate that energy costs are 1 to 
1.7 percent higher when utilities are included in rent. 
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based on observed choices in the marketplace, instead of beliefs stated on a survey. We are not 
aware of any large-scale randomized evaluations of energy efficiency information disclosure. 
 
Inattention 
Interventions that resemble information disclosure might change the buying patterns of 
consumers who are already well-informed. For example, Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009) find 
that despite the fact that consumers are well-informed about sales taxes, posting information 
about sales tax amounts in a supermarket changes buying patterns. This finding suggests the 
existence of another type of investment inefficiency, which behavioral economists call 
inattention. 
The psychology of inattention starts by recognizing that choice problems have many 
different facets, and some of these facets are less salient at the time of choice even if they are 
potentially important to the utility that will later be experienced. When buying printers, for 
example, we might focus on the purchase price and fail to consider that replacement ink 
cartridges make up the bulk of the total cost. Inattentive consumers are misoptimizing: they fail 
to recognize opportunities to save money by choosing products with lower ancillary costs. 
Research in a variety of other non-energy settings is suggestive of inattention (Hossein and 
Morgan 2006; Barber, Odean, and Zheng 2005; and Gabaix and Laibson 2006). It seems possible 
that some consumers might be inattentive to energy efficiency when purchasing energy-using 
durable goods. 
 
Policy Implications 
The available evidence on the size of an Energy Efficiency Gap is situation-specific, 
mixed, and often inconclusive. However, policymakers must make policy even in the absence of 
ironclad evidence.   
If the goal is to achieve efficient economic outcomes, then market failures should be 
addressed as directly as possible. In response to energy use externalities, a Pigouvian tax gives 
the first-best outcome. If agents are imperfectly informed and the government has an inexpensive 
information disclosure technology, an information disclosure approach should be used. 
Formulating policy becomes more challenging if the first-best solutions are not possible—when 
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information disclosure is not fully effective, or when a Pigouvian tax is not politically feasible 
because of aversion to new taxes or to policies that explicitly regulate greenhouse gases. In this 
section, we examine the effects of energy efficiency policies, considered as a second-best 
alternative. 
 
Energy Efficiency Subsidies and Standards as a Second-Best Approach to Pollution 
Abatement 
Until now, we have set aside the uninternalized energy use externalities and focused on 
investment inefficiencies. We now examine the converse: imagine a setting where no investment 
inefficiencies exist, but energy is priced below social cost (in our model, φ > 0). If Pigouvian 
taxes or cap-and-trade programs are politically infeasible, would energy efficiency subsidies and 
standards be a relatively promising approach to pollution abatement?  
When no investment inefficiencies exist, energy efficiency policies such as subsidies for 
energy efficient durable goods and minimum energy efficiency standards would have larger 
welfare costs per unit of pollution abated compared to the first-best Pigouvian tax for several 
reasons. First, subsidies and standards change relative prices for all consumers equally, while the 
Pigouvian tax provides a larger incentive for consumers with higher utilization to choose energy 
efficient capital stock. Second, the first-best policy must impose the right price on the utilization 
decision, which only the Pigouvian tax does. Third, it is difficult to calibrate the stringency of an 
energy efficiency standard or subsidy precisely, meaning that it will likely generate more or less 
carbon abatement than a Pigouvian tax set at the level of marginal damages. Energy efficiency 
policies in different sectors can also be miscalibrated against each other, causing inefficiency due 
to unequal marginal costs of abatement. 
Of course, if these three theoretical factors were small in reality, then energy efficiency 
policies might be a reasonable second-best substitute for Pigouvian taxes. Several analyses have 
simulated the relative cost effectiveness of particular energy efficiency policies relative to 
Pigouvian taxes. Jacobsen (2010), for example, simulates automobile supply and demand and 
shows that Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards have a welfare cost of $222 per 
metric ton of carbon dioxide abated, compared to $92 per ton for a gas tax that generates the 
same amount of abatement. Krupnick, Parry, Walls, Knowles, and Hayes (2010) come to a 
similar qualitative conclusion. They compare the cap-and-trade provisions of the proposed 
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Waxman–Markey climate change legislation to the legislation’s energy efficiency provisions, 
which include standards for buildings, lighting, and appliances. The cap-and-trade, or an 
equivalent carbon tax, abates carbon dioxide at an upfront welfare cost of $12 per ton. Under the 
assumption that there are no investment inefficiencies, the energy efficiency standards are five 
times more costly, or $60 per ton. This significantly exceeds the United States government’s 
estimated social cost of carbon dioxide emissions, which is about $21 (Greenstone, Kopits, and 
Wolverton 2011).9 
These results forcefully argue that Pigouvian taxes or cap-and-trade programs are the 
most efficient way to address energy use externalities. Energy efficiency subsidies, CAFE 
standards, and other energy efficiency policies can also reduce energy use externalities, but in 
any settings where there are no investment inefficiencies, such policies will often impose a 
significantly larger cost on the economy per unit of pollution reduction. 
 
Energy Efficiency Subsidies and Standards as a Second-Best Approach to Correcting 
Investment Inefficiencies 
The United States has long required energy-use information disclosure: for more than 30 
years, retailers have been required to display fuel economy ratings for new vehicles and energy 
cost information for home appliances. However, consumers may not notice, understand, or pay 
attention to this information. If information disclosure or other direct solutions to market failures 
are not fully effective, how useful are energy efficiency subsidies and standards as a second-best 
approach to addressing investment inefficiencies?  
Allcott, Mullainathan, and Taubinsky (2011) analyze this question when consumers are 
inattentive to energy costs.  As we discussed earlier, their model shows that energy efficiency 
subsidies can increase welfare and, when consumers are sufficiently homogeneous, the first-best 
can be obtained. The intuition is straightforward: if consumers and firms underinvest in energy 
efficiency, subsidizing or mandating them to invest more can increase welfare. However, any 
corrective policies must be properly calibrated. For example, the vast majority of benefits in the 
                                                            
9 As we will argue in the next section, energy efficiency policies can increase welfare when there 
are investment inefficiencies. Krupnick, Parry, Walls, Knowles, and Hayes (2010) quantify this, 
showing that under an assumed level of investment inefficiencies, energy efficiency standards 
abate carbon at a cost of $7 per ton.  
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U.S. government’s cost–benefit analysis of Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards derive 
from the assumption that the regulation corrects consumers’ inattention to energy efficiency 
when buying autos.10 However, Allcott (2012), Allcott and Wozny (2011), Fischer, Harrington, 
and Parry (2007), and Heutel (2011) use different models to show that the current and proposed 
CAFE standards are much more stringent than can be justified by even worst-case estimates of 
investment inefficiencies.11 Of course, if there are zero investment inefficiencies, then there are 
zero welfare benefits through this channel.  
Heterogeneity in the investment inefficiency γ weakens the policy argument for 
subsidizing energy efficient goods, as Allcott, Mullainathan, and Taubinsky (2011) also show. In 
Figure 3 presented earlier, imagine that some consumers are on demand curve D’ with γ = 1, 
while others are on demand curve D with γ < 1. Now, a subsidy moves the high-γ agents to point 
z, where they consume more energy efficiency than they would in the social optimum. This 
offsets the welfare gains from improving the decisions of the low-γ consumers. A key 
implication for policy analysis is that we must understand not just how much a policy increases 
sales of energy efficient goods, but who are the people induced to buy these goods. For example, 
even in a setting where the average consumer has γ < 1, energy efficiency subsidies might 
decrease total welfare if they are largely taken up by environmentalists and homeowners, who 
are more likely to be well-informed about energy efficiency and are not subject to a “landlord–
tenant” agency problem. 
This discussion highlights that energy efficiency policies are more likely to increase 
welfare if they target agents subject to the largest investment inefficiencies. Some existing 
policies do appear well-targeted. For example, households that use more energy than other 
                                                            
10 For more background, see the federal government’s Regulatory Impact Analysis of the 2012–
2016 CAFE standards (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2010) or the discussion 
in Allcott and Wozny (2011).   
11 Heutel calibrates the extent to which investment inefficiencies that cause consumers to 
undervalue gasoline costs by 30 percent decrease the average fuel economy of vehicles sold, 
relative to the optimum. An optimal policy response would therefore increase fuel economy by a 
corresponding amount. In Table 4, comparing column (1) to column (2) shows the effect of 
investment inefficiencies: 0.0439 gallons per mile (GPM) - 0.0426 GPM = 0.0013 gallons per 
mile. Thus, an optimal policy response decreases GPM by 0.0013 gallons per mile, or 
equivalently increases fuel economy by slightly more than 0.5 MPG. In Heutel’s model, CAFE 
standards would not be justified by his assumed level of investment inefficiency, given that they 
require fuel economy to increase by much more than 0.5 MPG. 
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comparable households are more likely to have low-cost energy conservation opportunities of 
which they are unaware, and many U.S. utilities now target energy conservation information to 
these relatively heavy users (Allcott, 2011b; Ayres, Raseman, and Shih, 2009). “Smart meters” 
that record hourly consumption, which as described in a companion paper by Paul Joskow in this 
symposium are increasingly being deployed across the United States, also provide information 
useful for targeting. For example, utilities can now identify households that use more energy on 
afternoon hours of particularly hot days, suggesting that they have energy inefficient air 
conditioners, and send them information on new energy efficient models. 
Aside from heterogeneity in the investment inefficiency, consumers and firms also have 
substantial heterogeneity in other factors that affect demand for energy and for energy efficient 
capital stock. For example, the mild climate of Los Angeles compared to the more extreme 
weather of Chicago means that there is substantial variation in utilization of air conditioners and 
heating equipment, and residential retail electricity prices vary across the country from 4 to 30 
cents per kilowatt-hour. As a result, national-level minimum efficiency standards for home 
appliances seem likely to decrease welfare for subsets of consumers with low prices and 
utilization and could increase welfare for high-price and/or -utilization consumers with 
investment inefficiencies. Ideally, standards could vary geographically to take account of this, 
targeting consumers that may have the most to gain. For example, building codes in states with 
extreme weather often require more insulation than building codes in mild climates. On the other 
hand, home appliance standards are set at the national level, and appliance manufacturers and 
retailers operate nationwide. The benefits of heterogeneous standards must be weighed against 
the costs of regulatory complexity. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Since the energy crises of the 1970s, many have made the “win-win” argument for 
energy efficiency policy: subsidies and standards can both address investment inefficiencies in 
the purchase of energy-using durable goods and reduce externalities from energy use. However, 
a reliance on observational studies of variable credibility and the possibility of unobserved costs 
and benefits of energy efficiency make it difficult to assess the magnitude of the Energy 
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Efficiency Gap definitively.  Nevertheless, the available evidence from empirical analyses of 
weatherization, demand-side management programs, automobile and appliance markets, the 
“landlord–tenant” agency problem, and information elicitation suggests that while investment 
inefficiencies do appear in various settings, the actual magnitude of the Energy Efficiency Gap is 
small relative to the assessments from engineering analyses.  
Furthermore, it appears likely that there is substantial heterogeneity in investment 
inefficiencies across the population. Thus, targeted policies have the potential to generate larger 
welfare gains than general subsidies or mandates. Given this heterogeneity, policy analyses need 
to do more than assess how much a policy affects energy efficiency: they must also identify what 
types of consumers are induced to be more energy efficient. 
We believe that this area is ripe for rigorous empirical research. Future research should 
utilize randomized controlled trials and quasi-experimental techniques to estimate the impacts of 
energy efficiency programs on heterogeneous consumer types and to address the challenges 
posed by unobserved costs and benefits. The economic insights from such research are 
potentially generalizable, and the policy implications are significant. 
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By Sector (U.S. EIA 2011)
Commercial 19%
Industrial 30%
Transport 29%
Residential 22%
Residential Categories (U.S. EIA 2005)
Refrigerators 5%
Air Conditioning 8%
Water Heating 20%
Space Heating 41%
Other Appliances and Lighting 26%
Table 1: United States Energy Use 
 
 
Source: Data are from U.S. Energy Information Administration (2005, 2011).   
 
 
  
 
 
Name Years Magnitude
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards 1978‐ $10 billion annual incremental cost from tightened 2012 rule (NHTSA 2010)
Federal Hybrid Vehicle Tax Credit 2006‐2010 $426 million total annual credit (Sallee 2010)
Gas guzzler tax 1980‐ $200 million annual revenues (Sallee 2010)
Federal appliance energy efficiency standards 1990‐ $2.9 billion annual incremental cost (Gillingham, Newell, and Palmer 2006)
Residential and commercial building codes 1978‐
Electricity Demand‐Side Management programs 1978‐ $3.6 billion annual cost (US EIA 2010)
Weatherization Assistance Program (WAP) 1976‐ $250 million annual cost (US DOE 2011b)
2009 Economic Stimulus 2009‐2011 $17 billion total (U.S. DOE 2011b)
     Additional WAP funding      $5 billion
     Recovery Through Retrofit      $454 million
     State Energy Program      $3.1 billion
     Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grants      $3.2 billion
     Home Energy Efficiency Tax Credits      $5.8 billion total credit in 2009 (U.S. IRS 2011)
     Residential and Commercial Building Initiative      $346 million
     Energy Efficient Appliance Rebate Program      $300 million
     Autos Cash for Clunkers      $5 billion
Table 2: Significant US Energy Efficiency Policies
 
Source: Authors. 
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Figure 1: Energy Costs for Durable Goods 
Source: Authors. 
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Figure 2: Productivity Trends 
Note: PPP is “purchasing power parity.” Multifactor productivity index equals 100 in 1990.  
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Source: Authors.  
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